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This paper analyses the association between inter-firm collaborative agreements and the 
technological capabilities of the largest European electronics firms between 1984 and 1997.  
To this purpose we collected information about 2,240 R&D agreements sponsored by the EU 
and 1,970 non sponsored agreements signed by the sample firm. We classified agreements 
into fourteen industrial sectors by using cluster analysis.  
Moreover, we selected the most important fourteen technological classes for the sample firms 
in the period 1984-1996 and for each class calculated the sample firms’ share in world patent 
applications. We analysed the effects of agreements on firms’ technological capabilities 
measured by patent shares.  
Our analysis shows that non-sponsored agreements have significant effects on the 
technological capabilities of the firm. However, only agreements with extra-European (US 
and Japanese) partners produce significant effects on the technological capabilities of the firm. 
Finally, EU-sponsored agreements have insignificant effects on technological capabilities. 
These results indicate that there is a weak complementarity among European electronics firms 
and suggest that a reshaping of EU policies towards collaborative R&D is required. 
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This paper analyses the accumulation of technological capabilities of large European firms 
operating in the information and communication industries (computers, telecommunications 
equipment, semiconductors and consumer electronics) (ICT).  
 
The position of Europe in these sectors is weak compared with the US and Japan. This is 
clearly shown by the share of total US patenting in the following technological classes: 
electronic capital goods and components, telecommunications equipment and consumer 
electronics. With few exceptions (such as Thomson-CSF in electronic components and 
Siemens and Philips in telecommunications) the share of European firms among the world 
larger innovators is small and declining between 1969 and 1990. Technological specialisation 
of European firms in these technologies is also weak and declining (Patel and Pavitt, 1994).  
However, more recently, new European firms have reached the technological frontier in these 
sectors (e.g., Nokia and Ericsson in mobile communication). 
 
The European firms operating in the information and communication industries (ICT) sectors 
have tried to catch up with the US and Japanese world leaders by relying on both in-house 
R&D and R&D collaborations. The economics literature has pointed out many potential 
benefits of R&D collaborative agreements: risk sharing, exploitation of economies of scale 
and scope, reduced duplication of research efforts, access to complementary assets and 
reduction of time to market (Teece, 1986; Jorde and Teece, 1990). Through R&D (including 
joint R&D) firms may also improve their ability to monitor, absorb and exploit external 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Rosenberg, 1990).
2  
 
Since the 1980s, the European Commission has supported R&D in the ICT sectors, especially 
joint R&D. While EU policy aims to stimulate innovation and to enhance the capabilities and 
competitiveness of the European industry overall, the ICT sectors have received a particular 
                                                           
1 An erlier draft of this paper was prepare for the "Dynacom" TSER Project, EC DGXII (contract no. SOE1-
CT97-1078). We would like to thank Andrea Ala and Sandro Sergiacomo for their contribution to data 
collection. We also thank Piero Cavaleri for his suggestions on the design of the database and Pari Patel for 
providing us with patent data collected at SPRU. Finally, Giovanni Dosi, Mike Hobday and Ed Steinmulluer 
have provided useful comments on earlier drafts of the paper. 
2 Another dimension of the relationship between innovation and agreements is represented by the effects of firms’ 
innovative capabilities (generic or context-specific) on the ability to set up linkages with different organisations  3
attention by the European Commission. This is mainly because the innovative activities of 
these sectors are expected to be "pervasive", i.e., they should yield significant potential 
spillovers for many other sectors (CEC, 1993 and 1995).  
 
What are the implications of EU-funded R&D programmes for the technological performance 
of ICT firms themselves? Given the small amount of EU-supported R&D as a share of total 
R&D expenditures of large European firms, we do not expect much direct effect on the 
technological performance of these firms. However, we examine whether these effects vary 
between EU-sponsored agreements in the firms’ core sector versus agreements outside the 
core sector. Moreover, we ask whether these publicly supported agreements produce effects 
similar to that of non-sponsored alliances.  
 
In order to address these issues this paper analyses the agreements of the largest 15 European 
electronics firms listed in Fortune 500 between 1984 and 1997.  The paper compares EC-
supported agreements with non-sponsored alliances undertaken by the sample firms. 
Moreover, the effects of sponsored and non-sponsored agreements on the firm technological 
performance are analysed in fourteen sectors. We use as indicator of technological 
performance the number of patents filed by the firm in each of these sectors as a share of the 
total World patents in the same sectors.    
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of the literature on 
R&D alliances. Section 3 illustrates some description of the data and Section 4 analyses the 
effects of inter-firm agreements on the technological capabilities of the sample firms. Section 
5 closes the paper. 
 
 
2. The literature and the research hypotheses 
 
Rapid technical change, the convergence of industries, and the rising internationalisation of 
markets spur firms￿ restructuring and growth, through M&As and strategic partnership (see, 
among others, Mytelka, 1995). The implications of inter-firm alliances for the R&D of the 
firm have been debated in the literature. Some scholars argue that such agreements stimulate 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(customers, competitors etc.) (Malerba and Torrisi, 1992).    4
opportunistic behaviour and R&D under-investment because of information asymmetries 
(Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Moreover, R&D alliances may give rise to problems of 
appropriability, information asymmetries, and coordination failures which increase transaction 
costs (Pisano, Russo and Teece, 1988; Porter and Fuller, 1986; Bleeke and Ernst, 1992).  
 
On the other hand, other scholars point out that R&D collaborations increase the private 
incentives to conduct R&D and, therefore, to correct the imperfections in the market for 
knowledge (Baumol, 1990). More precisely, the main benefits of R&D collaborative 
agreements are represented by risk sharing, exploitation of economies of scale and scope, 
reduced duplication of research efforts, access to complementary assets and reduction of time 
to market (Teece, 1986; Jorde and Teece, 1990). Finally, another reason for undertaking R&D 
collaboration is that firms may acquire new capabilities and improve their ability to monitor, 
absorb and exploit external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Rosenberg, 1990).  
 
The empirical evidence shows that the number of international R&D alliances has grown at an 
annual average rate of 10.8% between 1980 and 1994, and the percentage of R&D agreements 
has recently reached 10-15 per cent of all agreements (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1998).  There is 
also evidence of a relative growth in the use of non-equity agreements (strategic alliances) 
compared with equity alliances (such as joint ventures) (Hagedoorn, 1996). This can be 
explained by the fact that strategic alliances require less fixed costs than JVs and probably 
reduce the conflicts between partners that stem from problems of reconciling rent-sharing and 
different time horizons. Moreover, EU firms tend to engage in R&D alliances in sectors where 
they have not comparative advantages. Finally, in the 1990s  non-subsidised agreements 
among European firms have dropped while those between European firms and US firms have 
increased (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1998). 
 
Given that firms, particularly those operating in high tech sectors, rely increasingly on 
international R&D collaboration, why then should the EU sponsor R&D collaborations among 
European firms? One reason is the stimulation of collaboration among European firms to help 
them to reach a minimum efficient  scale of R&D operations and to reduce the technical gap 
with the US and Japanese leaders
3. The first generation of EU-sponsored programmes 
launched between 1984 and 1988 has probably helped European firms, especially small firms,  5
to gain access to complementary capabilities or join international networks. These EU-
sponsored projects were pre-competitive, fell within the core business areas of the 
participating firms and focused on niche technologies (Mytelka, 1995).  
 
In subsequent years, the EU has favoured joint R&D which aims to the development of 
"useful" technologies, closer to market needs. But this raises the question of why the EU is 
subsidising R&D activities that firms would probably conduct in any case, given the 
proximity of the research with  market needs. A rationale for this type of EU intervention is 
that the development of applications in new fields such as electronic commerce requires high 
costs associated with investments in quasi-public goods (e.g., network facilities and training) 
and brings about a high risk of failure because the information about the benefits of these 
applications is limited and both users and producers of these applications can be locked into 
an inferior technology. A lack of co-ordination between users and producers of these new 
applications then could give rise to a market failure that the policy-maker can correct by 
subsidising joint R&D that involve users. The problems of co-ordination are particularly 
significant in Europe, because of linguistic, cultural and institutional barriers across countries. 
It is worth noting that a large share of alliances analysed in this paper concern user-producer 
relationships (e.g., electronics equipment firms and chemicals or automobile manufacturers) 
where such co-ordination problems are expected to occur. 
 
A key question is whether EU-sponsored agreements have really helped European firms to 
coordinate  their R&D efforts, to exploit potential synergy and to reduce substantially the gap 
with their US and Japanese counterparts. 
 
A recent study on the semiconductor industry shows that, despite the EC support to infra-
European R&D collaboration, European firms have continued to rely mostly on collaborative 
linkages with US or Japanese companies, which still represent their main source of technology 
(Hobday, 1997). According to Hobday, this suggests that the EU programmes did not affect 
the technological strategy of European firms. Moreover, the pattern of international R&D 
agreements of the European semiconductor firms between 1980-84 and 1985-1991 suggests 
that these firms shifted from passive forms of technological agreements to more active forms 
(Hobday, 1997). This evolution in the patterns of technological agreements may indicate a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 The stimulus of cooperation is often mentioned in the literature (see, for instance, Folster, 1995).  6
growth in technological capabilities of the European firms. The evidence provided by Hobday 
does not clarify to what extent this improvement of capabilities depends upon the 
participation in joint R&D programmes sponsored by the EU or whether it is due to other 
factors (in-house R&D and learning associated with non-sponsored agreements). Our paper 
aims to test this hypothesis and to accomplish this purpose we compare the patterns of EU-
sponsored agreements with non-sponsored agreements and their implications for the 
technological performance of the firm. Moreover, unlike earlier works we adopt a measure of 
technological performance, which is the share of a firm’s patent applications in the total  world 
patent applications in different technological fields.  
 
 
3. The empirical analysis 
 
3.1. Data and methodology 
 
We have selected the largest European electronics firms listed in 1997 Fortune 500. For these 
15 firms we collected information, from the CORDIS database, on the participation in the EU 
programmes centred upon ICT (e.g., ACTS, Advanced Communications Technology and 
Services, ESPRIT, European Strategic Programme of Research in Information Technology, 
TELEMATICS, and Eureka) (CORDIS, 1998). Between 1984 and 1998 the sample firms 
were involved in 2,240 R&D agreements with more than 5,000 partners. It is worth noting 
that although in theory non-European firms are allowed to take part into EU-subsidised R&D 
programmes, we found only seven US partners and one from Japan. 
 
After elimination of inconsistencies and errors in the original database, we structured a 
qualitative data set which contains the following information for each project: the starting 
date, the partners involved and their respective home countries, and the main industrial sector 
(we assigned each project to a four-digit industry by using the US Standard Industrial 
Classification, 1987 revision). 
 
Moreover, we collected information on over 1,970 non-sponsored R&D agreements (JVs, 
licensing agreements and other R&D or technology-related agreements) undertaken by the 
sample firms during the period 1984-1997. The database called ARGO contains information  7
about events (agreements, growth operations, and corporate reorganisations) reported in a 
large set of trade journals, magazines and other specialised press. Events information was 
drawn from IAC’s Insite Promt database (http://www.insitepro.com) for the period 1993-1998. 
We have collected similar information for the period 1984-1992 from Predicasts F&S Index 
database. We also collected information about the number of subsidiaries by industrial sector 
from Dun & Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom database for the year 1983.  Finally, we collected 
information about the technological performance of the sample firms between 1970 and 1996. 
The technological performance of the firm is measured by US patents as classified by SPRU, 
University of Sussex. 
 
In order to analyse the effects of agreements on technological capabilities we classified both 
agreements and capabilities in 14 broad sectors. This aggregation has also the advantage of 
yielding results which are relatively easy to interpret. 
 
Patent data were grouped into 14 technological sectors by using the SPRU 34 technological 
classes (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). The 14 sectors reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix 
represent the largest single sectors among the SPRU 34 classes.  Overall, they account for 
more than 47,000 patents or about 90 per cent of the sample firms’ total patents between 1970 
and 1996. 
 
As far as agreements are concerned, we obtained 14 sectors by means of cluster analysis. To 
this end we drew from the IAC Promt database all the articles which report on all strategic 
alliances, licensing agreements, M&As, and new subsidiaries occurred in selected countries in 
1998.
4 The articles were in total 36,451. 
 
IAC’s Insite Promt database attaches to each article one or more four-digit SIC codes to 
identify the sector (s) involved in the article. This information allows us to calculate how 
many times two distinct SIC sectors are jointly reported in the sample articles. This leads to 
3,568 pairs of four-digit sectors and 6,748 joint frequencies on 627 different 4-digit sectors. 
                                                           
4 The countries selected are the United States, Japan, Germany and India, because they arise as the most 
important countries in our database from 1993-97. Among 11,905 selected events in our database, 10.555 (88%) 
include at least one of these countries.  8




Since the sample firms have been involved in only 129 3-digit sectors between 1984 and 
1997, we focused our analysis on these 129 sectors, which give rise to 5,940 joint frequencies. 
We then used these data to obtain 14 groups of related sectors through cluster analysis. The 
clusters obtained by using the centroid method and cosine similarity distance maximise the 
variance between groups while minimising the variance within groups.  
 
Tables A.3 in the Appendix shows the 14 clusters and Table A.4 shows the 3 digit SIC codes 
associated to each cluster. For each 3-digit SIC code the number of links with other 3-digit 
SIC codes in the same cluster is indicated.  
 
 
3.2 Preliminary  analysis 
 
We classified the collaborative agreements stipulated by the sample firms into two categories: 
•  Private agreements- AG (technological joint ventures and strategic alliances); 
•  EU sponsored agreements - CORDIS. 
 
Table 1 and Figure 1 show the evolution of agreements and patents of the sample firms as a 
whole. The increase of AG in the 1990s showed by our data is in line with earlier empirical 
studies (Hagerdoorn, 1996).
6  Also CORDIS agreements increases over time.  
 
Table 1: Patents and agreements 
Year 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Total
AG  88 80 88 85 61 68 66 48 132 168 195 351 204 337 1971
CORDIS  88 61 113 30 119 213 187 75 375 189 140 174 290 192 2246
Patents  1717 1846 1879 2496 2353 2792 2366 2390 2219 2178 2255 2254 2429 - 29147
 
Figure 1: Evolution of agreements and technological performance 
                                                           
5 Obviously, the number of matches observed are much smaller than the theoretical matches. The theoretical 
combinations of N (N=129) 3 digit SIC sectors taken 2 at a time is C=N!/[2!(N-2)!]=8,256.This difference is due 
to the fact that our firms are active in a relatively limited number of sectors. COLO!!  
6 Note that ICL and Nixdorf have been taken over by Fujitsu and Siemens respectively. These two firms have 
been considered separately even after the acquisition. Post-acquisition data have been drawn from their 

































Patents are a fairly good proxy for technological capabilities of the firm. Even though in some 
technological fields, such as software, patents are not used as an instrument to protect 
inventions, they represent indicator strongly correlated with other measures of technological 
efforts such as R&D expenditure (Griliches, 1990). Moreover, patent represent the most 
codified part of a firm technological knowledge. Technological capabilities, which are a 
source of sustained competitive advantage for the firm, rely on both codified knowledge (to 
the extent that this can be protected by intellectual property right) and tacit knowledge and 
organisational routines, which cannot be patented but are difficult to replicate and imitate 
(Barney, 1991). This limitation notwithstanding, however, patents are the most reliable 
instrument to measure the diversification of technological activities. Alternative measures 
such as the classification of R&D expenditures by line of business are only available for US 
firms. Moreover, also R&D-based measures have their limitations, including the classification 
criteria adopted, which are based on industrial classification (SIC) rather than technological 
classification (e.g., IPC).  
 
Our data show that patents applications of the sample firms overall increased significantly in 
the second half of the 1980s and remained stable (if not decreased) afterwards. The only  10
exceptions to this trend are Nokia and Ericsson, whose patent applications increased steadily 
over the period examined. 
 
Table 2 shows the relative importance of each sector in the firms technological and business 
activities. The sectors where most of the sample firms￿ technological activities were centred 
before 1984 are Telecommunication equipment (class 6), Instruments and Controls (class 4), 
Electrical Devices and System (class 7) and Image and Sound Equipment (class 5). These four 












share in total 
patents 
(1969-83) 
1 0.009  0.046 0.046 18 0.021 
2 0.005  0.001 0.01 16 0.029 
3 0.034  0.048 0.205 14 0.083 
4 0.065  0.035 0.179 30 0.124 
5 0.007  0.07 0.005 28 0.095 
6 0.249  0.307 0.055 24 0.17 
7 0.015  0.06 0.044 26 0.098 
8 0.099  0.146 0.013 27 0.088 
9 0.279  0.116 0.026 9 0.014 
10 0.173  0.118 0.032 25 0.06 
11 0.015  0.019 0.019 33 0.009 
12 0.023  0.003 0.001 4 0.029 
13 0.01  0.015 0.019 13 0.043 
14 0.016  0.011 0.325 31 0.015 
Total 0.999  0.995 0.979 0.878 
 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show substantial differences across the sample firms in the patterns of 
technological activities measured by US patent applications. As expected, Siemens and 
Philips appear as the most diversified firms; Ericsson and Racal show a marked concentration 
of technological activities in telecommunications. Finally, it is worth noting the increase in 
R&D intensity (R&D/sales) for Ericsson and Nokia. 
 
Table 3: Technological Diversification (US patents) 
Firm  Herfindahl  Specialisation Ratio Main Sector  RTA 
                                                           
7 See Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix for patent classification and the most important technological classes 
for the sample firms.   11
  1984-90 1991-96 1984-90 1991-96 1984-90 1991-96 1984-90 1991-96
ABB  0.135 0.139 0.169 0.194 18 18 0.941 0.967
Alcatel  0.170 0.221 0.351 0.426 24 24 0.790 0.805
Bull  0.251 0.487 0.483 0.703 27 27 0.816 0.816
EMI  0.169 0.166 0.195 0.215 26 25 0.699 0.671
Ericsson  0.260 0.474 0.475 0.677 24 24 0.840 0.873
GEC  0.181 0.178 0.303 0.331 18 30 0.825 0.619
Nokia  0.210 0.286 0.263 0.524 24 24 0.729 0.839
Philips  0.145 0.153 0.227 0.258 25 28 0.660 0.631
Racal  0.298 0.303 0.494 0.446 24 24 0.846 0.813
Schneider  0.258 0.246 0.418 0.359 24 26 0.821 0.794
Siemens  0.137 0.118 0.194 0.184 18 18 0.694 0.842
Thomson  0.155 0.207 0.235 0.402 24 28 0.705 0.746
Average  0.197 0.248 0.317 0.393 0.781 0.785
s.e.  0.056 0.122 0.085 0.121 0.057 0.071
 
 
     Table 4: Firm sales and R&D Expenditures ($ millions) 
Firm Sales  R&D  Expenditure  R&D/Sales 
  1984-90 1991-96 1984-90 1991-96 1984-90 1991-96
ABB 18974 30231 1540 2468 0.08 0.08
Alcatel 17232 30347 1497 2019 0.09 0.07
Bull 3689 5177 391 372 0.11 0.07
EMI 4943 6617 77 30 0.02 0
Ericsson 5183 12849 683 2039 0.13 0.16
GEC 8889 9953 1042 837 0.12 0.08
ICL 1293 2243 222 97 0.17 0.04
Nixdorf 2006 936 369 172 0.18 0.18
Nokia 3596 6565 215 578 0.06 0.09
Olivetti 5286 5662 280 266 0.05 0.05
Philips 24377 35367 2026 2113 0.08 0.06
Racal 2092 2193 93 125 0.04 0.06
Schneider 3042 7390 329 798 0.11 0.11
Siemens 26894 55119 2903 4977 0.11 0.09
Thomson 10105 13277 653 762 0.06 0.06
Average 9173 14928 821 1177 0.09 0.08
s.e. 8529 15658 828 1344 0.1 0.09
 
 
In general, the technological specialisation of our firms, calculated with the Herfindhal index 
(H) and the specialisation ratio (SR), increased between the 1980s and the 1990s. The ranking 
of technologies remained mostly the same for the period 1970-83.
8 
Table 5 illustrates patent applications filed by the sample firms as a share of the world patent 
applications in selected technological fields during the period 1960-1996. These shares 
measure the technological performance of the sample firms. The performance in 
                                                           
8 Herfindal index is a measure of diversification (sum of squared shares of each sector). The specialisation ratio 
represents the share of the largest sector in total patents. The RTA (revealed technological advantage) is an index 
of technological specialisation ((share of sector ’i’ in the firm total patent)/(share of sector i in the world patents in 
all sectors)).  12
telecommunications is significant and stable over time. The performance in electrical devices 
and systems is also relatively positive and increasing over time. The performance in 
computers and semiconductors is poor and declining over time.
9   
 
Table 5: Shares of the sample firms in world patent applications to the US Patent Office 
Spru Classes  1969-83 1984-90 1991-96
24 Telecommunications  0.261 0.219 0.274
30 Instrum.&control  0.191 0.170 0.213
28 Image&sound equipm.  0.152 0.100 0.134
26 Electrical devices&syst  0.207 0.226 0.257
27 Calculators, computers  0.125 0.070 0.104
14 General elect ind appar.  0.179 0.109 0.146
25 Semiconductors  0.175 0.079 0.141
13 Non electrical ind equip  0.171 0.185 0.159
16 Metallurgical equip  0.148 0.094 0.149
31 Misc metal products  0.135 0.136 0.188
33 Dentistry and surgery  0.159 0.202 0.181
18 Nuclear reaction  0.490 0.287 0.263
9   Materials  0.071 0.044 0.072




The sectors where most EU-sponsored R&D agreements are concentrated are Software (sector 
9), Telecommunications (sector 6), and Semiconductors (sector 10), which represent about 
70% of total agreements. 
The majority of non-sponsored agreements also centred on these sectors, with 
telecommunications (sector 6) emerging as the leading sector, followed by Computers (sector 
8), Semiconductors (sector 10) and Software (sector 9) (see Table 2 above).  
  
The commercial activities of the sample firms before 1984, proxied by the number of 
subsidiaries in 1983, appear to be more diversified than agreements. The largest four sectors - 
Transportation and Electrical Equipment (sector 3), Aircraft and Precision Instruments (sector 
4), Telecommunication (sector 6), and Energy (sector 1) - account for about 48% of total 
subsidiaries in 1983. But, unlike agreements, a large share of subsidiaries was classified in 
miscellaneous sectors (14).  This indicates that after 1984 the largest European electronics 
firms have focused their activities on fewer core sectors, even though during the period 
                                                           
9 The share of patents in nuclear reaction is largely explained by the importance of energy activities for ABB, 
Siemens and Alcatel.  13
between 1984 and 1997 both non sponsored and EU-sponsored agreements have become 
more diversified over time (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6  Diversification of private and EU-sponsored agreements 
 Herfindhal  Specialisation  Ratio 
Year  1984-90  1991-97  Private Agreements (AG)  EU Funded Agreements (Cordis)








ABB  1.000 0.300 0.231 0.153 - - 0.425 1 0.4 14 0.261 14
Alcatel  0.550 0.289 0.493 0.278 0.731 6 0.688 6 0.425 6 0.452 6
Bull  0.454 0.336 0.312 0.287 0.610 13 0.500 13 0.495 14 0.479 14
EMI  0.250 0.280 0.213 0.556 0.375 12 0.316 8 0.4 6 0.667 7
Ericsson  0.374 0.632 0.573 0.354 0.571 6 0.746 6 0.773 6 0.541 6
GEC  0.136 0.197 0.291 0.148 0.240 6 0.483 6 0.311 14 0.238 14
ICL  0.240 0.367 0.366 0.452 0.300 6 0.514 14 0.488 14 0.634 14
Nixdorf  0.497 0.355 0.643 0.338 0.607 14 0.786 13 0.529 14 0.509 14
Nokia  0.219 0.325 0.343 0.466 0.385 6 0.561 6 0.385 6 0.627 6
Olivetti  0.325 0.332 0.244 0.300 0.482 13 0.340 13 0.458 14 0.488 14
Philips  0.190 0.171 0.150 0.165 0.311 8 0.223 8 0.254 14 0.249 6
Racal  0.438 0.556 0.398 0.375 0.636 6 0.560 6 0.667 14 0.500 14
Schneider  1.000 0.556 0.333 0.148 - - 0.500 11 0.667 6 0.231 6
Siemens  0.227 0.161 0.151 0.159 0.398 6 0.293 6 0.228 14 0.230 14
Thomson  0.228 0.239 0.190 0.187 0.371 14 0.269 6 0.351 14 0.262 6
Mean  0.409 0.340 0.329 0.291 0.463 0.480 0.455 0.425
St.Err  0.269 0.141 0.148 0.132 0.153 0.173 0.155 0.163
 
 
We classified non sponsored agreements in two categories: ￿technological￿ and ￿non 
technological￿ agreements. Each agreement is classified in the first category when it has some 
R&D content (e.g., joint development of a technology); therefore multidimensional 
agreements (e.g., joint development and production of a new product) are all classified as 
technological agreements. Non technological agreements include orders and contract received, 
marketing alliances etc.  
Technological agreements represent a large share of total non sponsored agreements. Figure 2 
shows the evolution of technological and non-technological agreements. It indicates quite 
clearly that technological and non-technological agreements are correlated over time. 
Moreover, the distribution of agreements across sectors is very similar between technological 
and non-technological agreements. However, non technological agreements were excluded 
from our analysis in order to make non sponsored agreements comparable with EU-sponsored 
agreements. 
  14




















Finally, as table 7 clearly shows, US and Japanese firms represent the most frequent partners 
of our firms in non sponsored alliances.  
 
Table 7: Nationality of partners in non sponsored agreements 
  Country   
Firm  USA Japan UK France Germany Others  Total 
A B B  1 85500 5 4 8 2
Alcatel 51 11 6 9 7 41 125
Bull 47 16 6 17 7 39 132
E M I  1 826206 3 4
Ericsson 93 11 7 4 4 72 191
GEC 22 1 28 14 3 24 92
I C L  3 2 42 0 5 73 0 9 8
Nokia 31 9 8 3 3 49 103
Olivetti 38 15 4 12 3 70 142
Philips 146 72 23 13 19 89 362
Racal 14 0 18 1 0 10 43
S c h n e i d e r  302206 1 3
Siemens 205 41 34 25 37 238 580
Nixdorf 1 82103 2 6 5 0
Thomson 50 28 20 24 14 61 197
Total  786 217 188 131 107 815 2244
Shares  0.35 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.36
 
 
4. The association between inter-firm alliances and firms￿ technological capabilities 
 
A comparison between sponsored and non-sponsored agreements 
This Section explores the effects of EU-sponsored and other non-sponsored agreements on the 
sample firms￿ technological capabilities within and across the 14 sectors discussed before. 
The dependent variable is the share of firm ￿i￿ in the world patents filed to the US Patent 
Office in sector ￿j￿, year t (PATi,j,t=(Pij/Pwj)t ).
10  
                                                           
10 It is worth noting that our independent variables are most probably endogenous. We do not have exogenous 
variables to instrument our regressors. However to our purposes here we are not interested in causal 
relationships. The association between technological capabilities and agreements is by itself an interesting result. 
We tested the Granger causality between patent share and various categories of agreements (sponsored, non 
sponsored, in the core sector and outside the core sector). The results show that lagged patents (1 year lag) do not 
have significant effects on patents whereas the effect of lagged agreements is significant. 
Moreover, we do not analyse here the implications of technological perfomance (measured by patents) and the 
performance of the firm (e.s., sales growth). Preliminary inspections of our data show that there is a positive 
correlation between patent shares and sales growth of the sample firms. Although our dataset does not allow a 
rigorous analysis of this issue, earlier empirical works show that technological activities (measured by R&D or 
patents) do have significant positive effects on firm economic performance (total factor productivity and market 
value) (Mansfield, 1968, Griliches, 1979; Hall, 1993). The literature on the management of innovation also  16
The reason why we use patent shares among other possible measures is that this is easy to 
interpret. However, we found a strong correlation between patent shares and other indicators. 
For instance, the Pearson correlation between the patent share and the RTA index is high 
(0.88). 
To analyse the effects of both AG and CORDIS agreements on the technological capabilities 
of the firm we distinguished between agreements in the firm’s core sector and agreements 
outside the core sector. The core sector is defined here as the combination of the two most 
important sectors in terms of number of 1983 subsidiaries (at the three-digit SIC level). The 
distinction is based on the assumption that R&D agreements in the firm’s core sectors reveal a 
strategy of incremental competence development along the line of its basic capabilities. By 
contrast, R&D agreements outside the core business indicate a strategy of competence 
diversification, which can be either offensive or defensive. For instance, a firm like Olivetti 
during the 1990s has tried to recover from a serious crisis by restructuring and diversifying its 
activities. 
  
Patent shares were regressed on the following set of (lagged) explanatory variables: 
•  AG = Private agreements in the core sectors 
•  CO= CORDIS agreements in the core sectors 
•  OTHAG= Private agreements outside the core sectors 
•  OTHCO= CORDIS agreements outside the core sectors 
•  PATPERC= Patent Share of sector "j" in firm "i" 1983 patent stock  
•  RDCORE= annual R&D Expenditures in the core sectors (total R&D expenditures times 
the annual share of patents in the core sector). 
•  LOGSALES= Log of firm’s sales  
 
We tested the following econometric model 
 
PATi,j,t+1= β 1AGi,t +β 2COi,t+β 3OTHAGi,t+β 4OTHCOi,t 
        +β 5RDCOREi,t+β 6LOGSALESi,t+β 7PATPERCi,j+ ε i,t      (4.1) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
shows the importance of technological capabilities on firms’ economic performance (e.g., Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990).   17
This is a panel data model of 2,940 observations (14 years, 15 firms and 14 sectors), with the 
PATPERC variable capturing the fixed firm effects. Note that, unlike PATPERC, RDCORE 
varies over time.  Preliminary F-tests rejected the hypothesis of time fixed effects while the 
Hausman test rejected the presence of random effects.
11 
  
Table 8 shows the results of the regression analysis. The main effects of the regressors can be 
summarised as follows. 
 
Table 8: The effects of sponsored and non-sponsored agreements on technological 
performance  
R Square Adj. R Square Std. Error 
.906 .904 3,113E-03 
Coefficients 
Regressor B Std.  Error t p-value 
LOGSALES 2.711 1.892 1.433 0.152 
AG 1.081 0.803 1.346 0.178 
OTHAG 3.238 0.855 3.786 0.000 
CO 1.134 0.708 1.601 0.109 
OTHCO 0.957 0.710 1.349 0.177 
PATHPERC 1.004 0.068 14.776 0.000 
RDCORE 1.556 0.771 2.018 0.044 
 
 
1.  The EU sponsored agreements (in the core or in non-core sectors), do not have any 
significant effects on the technological performance of the firm. These findings suggest 
that the largest European electronics firms do not participate in sponsored network to 
conduct new research or to acquire new technological capabilities. They have probably 
different purposes such as monitoring new technological startups, to strengthen previously 
established collaborative links, to test prototypes and try new applications of their existing 
technologies. It is worth noting that when we regressed CORDIS agreements on business 
diversification (measured by firm subsidiaries in different three-digit SIC sectors) we 
found significant positive effects. This reinforces the idea that EU sponsored agreements 
for these firms are probably a way to exploit their knowledge to entry new businesses 
rather than a way to explore new technological trajectories. Unfortunately our data do not 
allow seeing what the effects are for smaller firms which take part in R&D networks 
sponsored by the EU. Moreover, we cannot rule out that EU-sponsored agreements 
produce some positive effects on technological capabilities. Many EU-sponsored joint 
                                                           
11 The Durbin-Watson tests rejects the hypothesis of serial correlation of residuals (DW=2.11).  18
R&D projects focus on the development of software technology, standards and "generic" 
architectures for the provision of services (e.g., multimedia services based on mobile 
communication platforms).  The output of these projects is difficult to protect from 
imitation by means of patents. This could explain why the use of EU-sponsored 
agreements has weak technological effects measured by patents. Therefore, most probably, 
the participants to these EU sponsored projects have also improved their knowledge, but it 
is unlikely that these improvements result in patented inventions. For instance, many 
participants in TAP (Telematics Applications Programme) expected significant results 
from the collaboration in terms of new or improved telematics applications and systems. 
As a matter of fact, many demonstrators, prototypes, new and improved products, 
subsystems and services have been produced under this Programme. However, the main 
technological achievements of TAP are represented by standards, software and services 
while new (hardware) products made a negligible contribution to this Programme, as 
demonstrated by the insignificant share of patent applications and grants associated to its 
various projects (SPRU, 1999). 
2.  Private technological agreements have a significant and strong effect on technological 
performance, particularly those in non-core sectors. The estimates clearly indicate that 
private agreements outside the firm’s core sectors increase the technological performance 
of the firm. We analysed the effects of agreements in specific sectors and found that some 
positive effects of private R&D agreements on the firms’ technological performance can 
be clearly associated with technological complementarities and cross-fertilisation among 
sectors and technologies
12. For instance, we found positive effects by agreements in 
’telecommunications on general electrical industrial apparatus’ technologies (class 3) 
which can be in part explained by the importance of ’energy storage’ technologies (which 
belong to class 3) for mobile phones. This example shows that our firms set up links in a 
downstream sector (mobile phone) to build up capabilities in upstream technologies that 
are critical for the competitiveness in the downstream sector itself. 
3.  These results confirm the importance of cumulativeness and path-dependence in firms’ 
technological activities, as showed by the strong effects of  past technological activities 
(PATPERC and RDCORE) on present technological performance. 
4.  We should notice here that a large share of the variance in the regression is captured by the 
PATPERC variable. Precisely, R
2  falls to 0.34 when we omit PATPERC.  However, the  19
significance of regressors is not affected by this omission. Moreover, our analysis is not 
centred on the R
2  of the equation by itself but to the fact that private agreements have an 
additional effects beyond that of internal accumulation of capabilities, measured by R&D 
expenditures and the pre-sample patent stock.
13 This indicates that both internal and 
external channels of knowledge accumulation produce significant effects on the 
technological performance of the firm. 
 
Skill Complementarity 
How can we explain the different effects of private and sponsored agreements on the 
technological performance of the sample firms?  Why the technological complementarities 
and cross fertilisation  discussed before did not show up in joint R&D sponsored by the EU? 
As mentioned above, it is possible that with sponsored agreements the sample firms pursue 
objectives different than the production of new technological knowledge (exploitation of 
existing technologies rather than exploration of new ones). Another possible explanation is 
that firms use sponsored agreements to develop knowledge which is not appropriable by 
means of patents - e.g., software. As a matter of fact, a large share of EU-sponsored 
agreements concerns software technology. Their potential effects on the technological 
capabilities of the firm cannot be measured by our indicator. However, the analysis of the 
effects of EU-sponsored agreements in software reveals that these agreements did not produce 
any effect on other related technologies such as telecommunications or computing. 
Furthermore, EU-sponsored agreements in other sectors (telecommunications and 
semiconductors) where the bulk of these agreements is concentrated do not produce any 
technological effect either.   
A further explanation of the different effects observed is that private agreements offer greater 
opportunities to exploit the knowledge spillovers and technological complementarities 
compared with sponsored agreements. These opportunities in turn should arise from a greater 
degree of  complementarity among the partners. The implications of competence 
complementarity for the outcome of joint R&D has been discussed at length in the literature 
(see, for example, Teece, 1992). When competence complementarity is high partners tend to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12 The estimates of these effects are not reported in this paper but can be provided by the authors. 
13 We tried different specifications of some independent variables (e.g., SALES, SALES**2 and PATPERC**2) 
to account for possible scale and specialisation effects. The results showed in the tables are robust to alternative 
specifications of SALES while the effect of PATPERC**2 is not significant. 
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share their capabilities and this in turn favours "synergy" and innovation. By contrast, partners 
with similar technological capabilities tend to sign agreements which aim primarily to share 
R&D costs rather than to exploit "synergy". This reduces the potential innovative outcome of 
these agreements (Sakakibara, 1997).  
Complementarity can be defined on a purely technological ground, as in the case of two 
partners with co-specialised technical capabilities (e.g., software and semiconductors). 
Complementarity can be defined in a broader sense by including non technological 
capabilities. For instance, the agreements between a firms specialised in semiconductors and 
another one with expertise in system integration and assembling of electronic equipment for a 
specific market niche.  
 
Our data do not allow to test directly the hypothesis of complementarity, but we can try an 
indirect test by assuming that the level of complementarity (broadly defined) in agreements 
between European and non EU firms (US and Japanese) is greater than that in agreements 
among European partners. A basic source of complementarity between many European firms 
and their US and Japanese counterparts is simply represented by their different specialisation - 
marketing and servicing capabilities in the European markets Vs. technological and 
organisational capabilities in semiconductors or computers respectively. Another source of 
complementarity between EU and non European firms is mostly technical. An example of 
such complementarity is represented by the strategic alliance between Ericsson, the world’s 
largest supplier of switching systems, and Tandem Computers, a market leader in open 
parallel processing reliable client server solutions and enterprise networks. The deal signed in 
1995 enabled Ericsson to integrate Tandem’s Unix platform into its future products. The 
agreement also concerned the incorporation of present and future Tandem computing 
solutions for Unix systems into Ericsson’s future AXE solutions.  
 
Since EU-sponsored agreements do not involve extra-European partners we have to focus our 
analysis on private agreements and distinguish between infra-European agreements and extra-
European ones. The latter are defined as those alliances with at least one extra-European 
partner.   
Over 66% of private alliances in our dataset include two partners, 23% three partners and 11% 
more than three partners. 59% of agreements with two partners, 63% of agreements with three 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
  21
partners and 73% of agreements with more than three partners respectively are extra-
European. 
 
We regressed the same dependent variable analysed before (PAT) with the following lagged 
regressors: 
•  RDCORE= R&D Expenditure in the core sector  
•  LOGSALES= Log sales of firm  
•  EUAG = Intra-EU private agreements in the core sectors 
•  EUNOAG = Intra-EU private agreements outside the core sector 
•  WAG = Extra-EU private agreements in the core sectors 
•  WNOAG = Extra-EU private agreements outside the core sectors  
•  PATPERC= Patent Share of Firm "i " in sector "j" calculated with 1983 patent stock  
 
The model tested is the following: 
 
PATi,j,t+1= β 1EUAGi,t+β 2EUNOAGi,t+β 3WAGi,t+β 4WNOAGi,t 
                           +β 5RDCOREi,t+β 6LOGSALESi,t+β 7PATPERCi,j + ε i,t     (4.2) 
 
The results of the regressions reported in Table 9 confirm that extra-European agreements 
signed outside the core sector of the firm have a positive and significant effect on 
technological performance. These findings support the hypothesis that the level of 
complementarity among partners drives the effect of non-sponsored agreements on the 
technological performance of the firm.   22
Table 9: The effects of agreements with non-EU partners 
R Square Adj R Square Std. Error 
0.906 0.906 3,112E-03 
Coefficients 
Regressor Beta s.e. t p-value 
RDCORE 1.272 0.616 2.065 0.039 
LOGSALES 6.800 4.149 1.639 0.101 
PATHPERC 1.004 0.007 151.330 0.000 
EUAG 3.038 2.126 1.429 0.153 
WNOAG 4.748 1.129 4.206 0.000 
WAG 5.160 7.748 0.666 0.505 
EUNOAG 1.098 1.112 0.987 0.324 
 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper analyses the effects of inter-firm collaboration on the technological capabilities 
measured by the patent applications of the largest European electronics firms between 1984 
and 1997.  
During this period EU firms have continued to rely on non-EU partners, especially North 
Americans, despite the rising number of EU-sponsored agreements in the same period. This 
suggests that European firms have more incentives to set up links outside the EU in order to 
gain access to complementary capabilities and resources (such as technology) which are 
mostly possessed by US and Japanese firms. 
The regression analysis shows that EU-sponsored agreements have insignificant effects on 
technological capabilities. 
By contrast, non-sponsored agreements have significant effects on firm￿ capabilities in many 
technological fields. In particular, agreements with extra European partners signed outside the 
core sector show significant effects on the technological capabilities of the sample firms. 
How to explain these differences in the effects on the technological capabilities of the firms?  
The positive effects of agreements with US and Japanese firms outside the firm’s core sector 
suggests that the complementarity of capabilities between partners is probably a main factor at 
work. By complementarity we mean the presence of co-specialised technical, organisational or 
commercial capabilities, e.g. the knowledge of a generic technology such as microelectronic 
and the expertise in specific applications such as medical equipment or industrial automation 
equipment. 
Why non-sponsored agreements among EU firms do not produce in general significant effects 
on the technological capabilities of the firm? As in the case of sponsored agreements, the  23
main reason is probably represented by a lack of complementarity among partners. This does 
not imply obviously that all non sponsored agreements within the group of European firms 
suffer from a lack of complementarity. Consider, for instance, the agreement signed in 1997 
by Siemens and EDAP Technomed, a French company specialised in "minimally invasive 
urological therapy". This is an example of non-sponsored agreement centred on the 
exploitation of skill complementarity. With this alliance the two firms agreed to joint develop 
a new urological platform for non invasive diagnosis, combing EDAP￿s capabilities in 
minimally invasive medical therapies and Siemens￿ experience in the field of medical 
equipment and image processing. As a result of this agreement in 1998 these two firms were 
jointly granted a patent from the US Patent Office concerning a ￿Method and apparatus for 
ultrasound tissue therapy￿.  Our results however suggest that this example is an exception 
more than the rule for non sponsored agreements between European firms.  
According to our analysis then two European electronic firms which are identical in all 
respects (size, past technological activities etc.) except for the number of Extra-European 
agreements, should differ in their technological performance (the firm with a larger number of 
agreements should have a larger expected technological performance). 
 
We should warn about some important limitations of our results. One of such limitation is that 
our data do not allow observing directly the technological outcome of each agreement. Neither 
we can distinguish across agreements of different "quality", that is agreements with different 
technological potentiality or a different degree of complementarity between partners. 
Moreover, due to the selection bias of our sample (the largest electronics European firms), we 
cannot draw any general conclusion about the effects of EU R&D policies on firms’ 
technological performance. It is important to remember that the size of EU funds allocated to 
joint R&D is very limited compared with the scale of R&D of the largest European electronics 
firms. For example, Esprit funds for the period 1984-1994 have an order of magnitude similar 
to the R&D expenditures of Siemens in 1990. Moreover, the cumulative contribution of Esprit 
to Bull in the 1980s was about 5% of its total R&D expenditures (Mytelka, 1992 and 1995). 
Probably, EU-sponsored programmes are more relevant to SMEs and future empirical should 
collect more careful information on the implications of these programmes for SMEs. By the 
same token, our analysis does not account for the possible effects of EU programmes on users 
since we only focus on the generation of technology. If anything, our analysis indicates that  24
EU policies show limited effects on  the production of new patented technology. This may 
reflect particular problems with the organisation of EU projects in terms of IPR arrangements. 
 
The overall picture emerging from these results suggests that the most successful strategy of 
technological learning for large European electronics firms draws on both internal 
accumulation of capabilities (as showed by the importance of R&D and past patent 
applications) and the acquisition of new knowledge from complementary (and technologically 
strong) partners. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the European Commission 
should reconsider carefully its policies towards joint R&D and possibly adopt a more 
￿outward-looking￿ approach by allowing the participation of non European firms in EU 
programmes. It is worth noting that even though non-European firms are allowed to 
participate in EU programmes, the small number of US and Japanese firms involved in these 
programmes suggests that extra-EU firms have not enough incentives to join EU R&D 
Programmes.  And this may be one of the reasons of the poor technological output of these 
programmes. 
We cannot conclude that the EU policies have distorted the patterns of alliances of the 
European electronics firms since these have been involved in a great deal of intra-European 
collaboration outside the EU umbrella. However, it is possible that the EU policies have 
strengthened the network of intra-European collaboration and therefore reinforced a pattern of 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1.   SPRU patent classes 
1 Inorganic Chemicals                                                    
2 Organic Chemicals                                                      
3 Agricultural Chemicals                                                 
4 Chemical Processes                                                     
5 Hydrocarbons, mineral oils, fuels and igniting devices                 
6 Bleaching Dyeing and Disinfecting                                      
7 Drugs and Bioengineering                                               
8 Plastic and rubber products                                            
9 Materials (inc glass and ceramics)                                     
10 Food and Tobacco (processes and products)                             
11 Metallurgical and Metal Treatment processes                           
12 Apparatus for chemicals, food, glass etc.                             
13 General Non-electrical Industrial Equipment                           
14 General Electrical Industrial Apparatus                               
15 Non-electrical specialized industrial equipment                       
16 Metallurgical and metal working equipment                             
17 Assembling and material handling apparatus                            
18 Induced Nuclear Reactions: systems and elements                       
19 Power Plants                                                          
20 Road vehicles and engines                                             
21 Other transport equipment (exc. aircraft)                             
22 Aircraft                                                              
23 Mining and wells machinery and processes                              
24 Telecommunications                                                    
25 Semiconductors                                                        
26 Electrical devices and systems                                        
27 Calculators, computers, and other office equipment                    
28 Image and sound equipment                                             
29 Photography and photocopy                                             
30 Instruments and controls                                              
31 Miscellaneous metal products                                          
32 Textile, clothing, leather, wood products                             
33 Dentistry and Surgery                                                 
34 Other - (Ammunitions and weapons, etc.)                               
 
Table A.2 : Sample firms’ most important technologies  
SPRU Classes  Description 
24Telecommunications 
30Instruments and controls 
28Image and sound equipment 
26Electrical devices and systems 
27Calculators, computers 
14General Electrical Industrial Apparatus 
25Semiconductors 
13General Non-electrical Industrial Equipment  
4Chemical Processes 
16Metallurgical and metal working equipment 
18Induced Nuclear Reactions 
33Dentistry and Surgery 
31Miscellaneous metal products 
9
Materials (inc glass and ceramics) 
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Table A.3: Sectors resulting from the cluster analysis (agreements) 
Sectors Description 
1 Energy 
2  Metalworking products and machinery 
3  Transportation and Electrical Equipment 
4  Aircraft and Precision Instruments 
5  Broadcasting, Satellite Comm. and Electronic Equip. 
6 Telecommunication 
7 Consumer  Electronics 
8  Office and Computing Machines 
9 Computer  Services 
10 Semiconductors 
11  Drugs, Pharmaceuticals and Medical Instruments 
12 Chemicals 




Table A.4: Concordance between industrial clusters and 3 digit SIC sectors 
Cluster  N￿ links  SIC Code  Description 
1  312  491  Electric Utilities 
1  196  162  Bridge and Tunnel Contruction 
1  122  492  Gas Utilities 
1  116  131  Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 
1  98  891  Engineering and Architectural Svcs 
1  98  291  Petroleum 
1  58  110  Coal 
1  56  361  Electrical Power Equipment 
1  16  458  Air Transport Facilities 
2  222  331  Primary Iron and Steel 
2  56  354  Metalworking Machinery 
2  2  332  Iron and Steel Foundary 
3  406  371  Motorvehicles and Parts 
3  108  369  Electrical and Electronics NEC 
3  80  671  Financial Holding Company 
3  60  362  Electric Industrial Equip. 
3  58  731  Advertising 
3  46  301  Tires and Tubes 
3  28  351  Engines and Turbines 
3  24  364  Electric Lighting and Wiring 
3  22  358  Services Industry Machines 
3  16  349  Fabricated Metal Products NEC 
3  12  495  Pollution Control 
3  8  336  Nonferrous Foundries 
3  8  326  Ceramics and Related Products 
4  116  372  Aircraft and Parts 
4  100  382  Measuring and Control Instruments 
4  92  383  Optical and Analytical Instruments 
4  74  508  Machinery Equip. And Supplies Whsle 
4  46  506  Electrical Goods Whsle 
4  44  335  Non Ferrous Mill Products 
4  42  356  General Industry Machinery 
4  10  300  Rubber and Plastic Products 
4  8  343  Plumbing and Heating Equip. 
5  340  483  Radio and TV Broadcasting 
5  296  360  Electical and Electronic Equip. 
5  276  386  Photographic Equip. And Supplies  29
5  148  484  Satellite Communication 
5  74  376  Missiles, Space Vehicles and Parts 
5  44  998  Diversified Company 
5  30  380  Instruments and Related Products 
5  20  573  Radio, TV, Music, Electronics Store 
5  16  454  Commercial Space Services 
5  16  374  Railroad Equip. 
5  12  348  Ordnance and Accessories 
5  8  910  Public Administration and Finance 
5  4  381  Engineering and Scientific Instr 
5  2  370  Transport Equip. 
5  2  334  Secondary Nonferrous Metal 
5  2  379  Transport Equip. NEC 
6  932  481  Telecommunication 
6  650  366  Communication Equip. 
6  38  401  Railroads 
6  32  480  Communications 
6  26  322  Glass Containers 
6  20  344  Fabricated Structural 
6  4  494  Water Supply and Use 
6  2  490  Electric Gas Utilities 
7  266  365  Consumer Electronics 
7  100  363  Household appliance 
7  40  739  Business Services 
7  34  519  Wholesalers NEC 
7  16  373  Ship and Boat building 
7  8  431  Mail Express and Services 
7  2  824  Vocational Education 
8  458  357  Office and Computing Machines 
9  720  737  Computer Services 
10  386  367  Electronic Components 
11  546  283  Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 
11  454  280  Chemicals and allied Products 
11  134  384  Medical Instruments and Supplies 
11  30  800  Health, Education and Welfare 
11  22  851  Research and Development 
11  16  299  Petroleum and Energy Products NEC 
11  2  385  Ophthalmic Goods 
11  2  738  Contract Packaging Services 
12  294  286  Organic Chemicals 
12  224  282  Plastics, Rubber, Fiber 
12  108  281  Inorganic Chemicals 
12  54  285  Paints and Allied Products 
12  52  289  Misc Chemical Products 
13  304  307  Plastic Products 
13  114  355  Special Industry Machinery 
13  108  333  Non Ferrous Metals 
13  82  330  Metals 
13  66  350  Machinery Ex-Electric 
13  40  602  Commercial Banks 
13  40  347  Metal Plating and Coating 
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13  24  260  Paper and Allied Products 
13  22  220  Textile Mill Products 
13  18  581  Eating Places 
13  16  270  Printing and Publishing 
13  4  154  Non Residential Bulding 
13  4  375  Motorcycles and Bicycles  30
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14  1  470  Transport Services 
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The Research Programme
The DRUID-research programme is organised in 3 different research themes:
- The firm as a learning organisation
- Competence building and inter-firm dynamics
- The learning economy and the competitiveness of systems of innovation
In each of the three areas there is one strategic theoretical and one central empirical
and policy oriented orientation.
Theme A: The firm as a learning organisation  
The theoretical perspective confronts and combines the resource-based view (Penrose,
1959) with recent approaches where the focus is on learning and the dynamic
capabilities of the firm (Dosi, Teece and Winter, 1992). The aim of this theoretical
work is to develop an analytical understanding of the firm as a learning organisation.
The empirical and policy issues relate to the nexus technology, productivity,
organisational change and human resources. More insight in the dynamic interplay
between these factors at the level of the firm is crucial to understand international
differences in performance at the macro level in terms of economic growth and
employment.
Theme B: Competence building and inter-firm dynamics
The theoretical perspective relates to the dynamics of the inter-firm division of labour
and the formation of network relationships between firms. An attempt will be made to
develop evolutionary models with Schumpeterian innovations as the motor driving a
Marshallian evolution of the division of labour.
The empirical and policy issues relate the formation of knowledge-intensive regional
and sectoral networks of firms to competitiveness and structural change. Data on the
structure of production will be combined with indicators of knowledge and learning.
IO-matrixes which include flows of knowledge and new technologies will be
developed and supplemented by data from case-studies and questionnaires.Theme C: The learning economy and the competitiveness of systems of innovation.
The third theme aims at a stronger conceptual and theoretical base for new concepts
such as 'systems of innovation' and 'the learning economy' and to link these concepts
to the ecological dimension. The focus is on the interaction between institutional and
technical change in a specified geographical space. An attempt will be made to
synthesise theories of economic development emphasising the role of science based-
sectors with those emphasising learning-by-producing and the growing knowledge-
intensity of all economic activities.
The main empirical and policy issues are related to changes in the local dimensions of
innovation and learning. What remains of the relative autonomy of national systems
of innovation? Is there a tendency towards convergence or divergence in the
specialisation in trade, production, innovation and in the knowledge base itself when
we compare regions and nations?
The Ph.D.-programme
There are at present more than 10 Ph.D.-students working in close connection to the
DRUID research programme. DRUID organises regularly specific Ph.D-activities
such as workshops, seminars and courses, often in a co-operation with other Danish
or international institutes. Also important is the role of DRUID as an environment
which stimulates the Ph.D.-students to become creative and effective. This involves
several elements:
- access to the international network in the form of visiting fellows and visits at the
sister institutions
- participation in research projects
- access to supervision of theses
- access to databases
Each year DRUID welcomes a limited number of foreign Ph.D.-students who wants
to work on subjects and project close to the core of the DRUID-research programme.
External projects
DRUID-members are involved in projects with external support. One major project
which covers several of the elements of the research programme is DISKO; a
comparative analysis of the Danish Innovation System; and there are several projects
involving international co-operation within EU's 4th Framework Programme. DRUID
is open to host other projects as far as they fall within its research profile. Special
attention is given to the communication of research results from such projects to a
wide set of social actors and policy makers.DRUID Working Papers
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